Friday 15 May 2026 15.00-17.00 Amsterdam (English spoken)
Speakers: Luke O’Sullivan (National University of Singapore)
Organised by: Chiel van den Akker (Study Group Philosophy of History), in consultation with the Huizinga Research Network Theory of History
Room: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, MF-Building, room MF A307, Van der Boechorststraat 7, Amsterdam
The upcoming meeting of the Study Group Philosophy of History in consultation with the Huizinga Research Network Theory of History will take place on Friday, 15 May 2026, at 3 p.m., at room A307 of the MF-Building of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Van Boechorststraat 7, Amsterdam Speaker is Luke O’Sullivan from the National University of Singapore. He will be speaking about Historicity and Historicality.
Those wanting to attend can express their interest via the contact form of the Study Group Philosophy of History.
Abstract
If we are to understand the phenomenon of historicity correctly, we must distinguish between our lived experience of the past and the view of the past that emerges from the study of it. That is, we must insist on a distinction between historicity, and the natural relation to the past that is characteristic of memory, and historicality, the kind of analysis of the past associated with historical writing. A sense of historicity is an inevitable feature of human life; indeed, memory is something we have in common with animals. But historicality is a symbolic and theoretical mode of apprehending the past that requires language.
This distinction has significant ramifications. Most of what is talked about under the heading of ‘history’ actually belongs to the past understood as significant for or relevant to ourselves. This is especially true in a political context. As Orwell pointed out long ago, who controls the present, controls the past; and who controls the past, controls the future. The current struggles we are witnessing over the past in America, Russia, and elsewhere are really battles for control of the future. The slogan ‘Make America Great Again’, for example, assumes a past era of American greatness, and also that it is possible to recreate the supposed glories of the past. But none of this has anything to do with history as written by historians.
Historicity and historicality are thus at least potentially in tension with one another. Our natural tendency is to look towards the past as a guide to the future, but that means that we are interested not primarily in the truth about the past, but its utility. This is not necessarily problematic; but it does become a problem when the narratives of the past that we encounter in a political context are in tension with the evidence for the past as understood by historical analysis. Politicians may downplay or ignore past events that are inconvenient for their own agendas. The theoretical tension between historicity and historicality thus leads us to consider the role of historical analysis in public life.
The fact that many of the challenges we face are historically unprecedented may lead some to question whether historiography remains important. But once we understand that we are not studying the past as a guide to the future, it becomes clear that historical scholarship remains extremely important. The maintenance of a free and open society has as one of its conditions that historiographical analysis plays a vital role as a negative, censorial check on unsupported claims about the past. Contemporary examples include Holocaust denial, the minimization of harms from slavery, and the existence of an original pan-Slavic unity. All of these claims are made in the service of political agendas that threaten the continued existence of an open, liberal, way of life. On this basis we may reassert the continuing and indeed permanent relevance of historical scholarship.